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This is a thoroughly splendid book on a splendid topic of free will! In a 
novel and very interesting way, St. Anslem’s (of Canterbury) theory of free 
will is (re)formulated and put amidst ultra-contemporary debate; not only 
this, Katherin Rogers, in her version of Anselmianism about freedom of the 
will, strives to show how this kind of theory has certain advantages over 
other theories of freedom of the will and, accordingly, freedom of action. 
Almost needless to say, Rogers’s, following St. Anselm, put forward the 
theory from the theistic Christian perspective. I consider her exposition of 
St. Anselm very clear and her (re)formulated arguments on the basic foun-
dation of St. Anselm’s theory very persuasive, as well as her own develop-
ment of additional arguments for the agent-causal libertarianism. Accord-
ing to Rogers’s, agent-causal libertarianism derived from St. Anselm, and 
supplemented with some contemporary tools that retain Anselmian spirit, 
can have more explanatory power with less theoretical entities. In other 
words, Anselmian agent-causal libertarianism, Rogers claims, is more par-
simonious than other contemporary versions. St. Anselm put forward his 
theory and arguments about the freedom of the will and responsibility in 
the most explicit way in the texts De libero arbitrio, De casu diaboli, and 
Cur Deus homo.1
Let’s take theory and arguments in order of the Kathrin Rogers’s book. 
It begins with two arguments that are aimed to undermine compatibilism, 
showing that notion of the freedom is incompatible with notion of deter-
minism. The fi rst is so-called “The Divine Controller” argument and the 
other is “Wager” argument. 
The Christian doctrine holds that everything that is different from God 
depends on God, so there can be nothing that has existence independent 
of God. God is also omnipotent. So we can imagine the following scenario. 
Though we can analyse the attribute of omnipotence in different ways, it is 
certainly possible that God can cause human beings’ choices. If that would 
be so, then choices that human beings make are not their own choices, 
they do not make them on their own, but they are made by somebody else, 
namely God. If so, then each and every choice is fully determined by God. 
1 Katherin Rogers uses her own translations from Latin from Anselmi Opera Omnia, 
edited by F. S. Schmitt, Rome and Edinburgh: Friedrich Fromann Verlag, 1936–1968.
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So, human beings’ choices, and accordingly, actions that follow, would be 
fully determined by the factor other than them and on which they would 
have no control. Their choices would not be “up to them”. We could also say 
that these choices would only “happen” to them (even if from the subjective 
point it would seem, but it would only seem, that the choices in question are 
their own); and if something just happens to me without any possibility that 
I have any kind of control or infl uence on that what happens, then this what 
happens is not free at all from the point of mine as an agent. If that would be 
the situation, then corollary is that human beings would not be responsible 
for these choices and actions. Rogers stresses parallels of this argument 
with other contemporary “controller” or “manipulation” arguments, but dif-
ferences also. So, compatibilists, which embrace determinism, could not at 
the same time consistently claim that though actions and will of agents are 
fully determined, they can still be morally responsible and could have done 
otherwise than they in fact did.
Wager argument for libertarianism parallels in form, but just in form, 
Pascal’s wager argument for the existence of God. Assume that a compati-
bilist, accepting determinism, considers that what happens, happens inevi-
tably, so has a relaxed attitude towards morality. Let’s suppose that you 
have to choose either compatibilism or libertarianism. You score +1 for your 
benefi t, you score –1 for suffering harm. Believer in compatibilism scores +1 
if compatibilism is true, but being tempted to moral laxness he scores –1, so 
score is 0; Believer in compatibilism scores –1 if compatibilism is false and 
–1 for being tempted to moral laxness, so in this case score is –2. Believer 
in libertarianism scores –1 if libertarianism is false, and scores +1 for not 
being prone to moral laxness, so the score is in this case 0. Believer in lib-
ertarianism scores +1 if libertarianism is true, and scores +1 for not being 
prone to moral laxness, so the score is in this case +2. Overall, it is better 
to bet on libertarianism than on compatibilism. This is not a defi nitive ar-
gument for libertarianism but points strongly in favour of libertarianism 
according to Rogers.
After relatively briefl y reviewing event-causal and agent-causal liber-
tarianism and setting stage for Anslem’s view and Anselmianism, Rogers 
continues and warns us that we have to differentiate three meanings of 
voluntas in st. Anslem’s writings. These are: voluntas instrumentally con-
ceived as a faculty of the soul; voluntas in the second sense is that what 
moves will of an agent to what is a suitable object for an agent; third sense 
of voluntas is the actual use of the will.
In chapter three, Rogers explicates Anselm’s and Anselmian libertarian-
ism. It is a sort of agent-causal libertarianism. Agent makes, when freely 
deciding, so-called a se choices. How does he do it? Fisrt of all, everything 
that is different from God is created by God and depends on God. So how 
can genuine and free choice and following this choice, an action be free and 
dependent on subject, e.g. human being which is created by God and differ-
ent from Him? It can be in the following way. God created human beings, 
and God created all motivating states, processes and elements that precede 
the choice of human beings. But human beings are created as (more or less) 
rational beings. So, they can come in the situations that are such that only 
one action can be made at time t, but there is a possibility for executing 
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at least two mutually exclusive actions at t, at the same time: so, only one 
can be performed—human being, as a rational being, must decide which 
action will be performed at t. This situation is called a “torn condition”. 
It is a necessary condition for making a se choice. Especially signifi cant 
situations are moral situations—where agents are torn between different 
morally signifi cant options. So, libertarian request is fulfi lled, there are al-
ternate possibilities facing an agent. They “set the stage” for an agent and 
they are produced by God. But the choice an agent makes is something 
that the agent truly makes by himself. Choice itself is not imposed or made 
or infl uenced by God. Choice is an operating of the agent, so it is agent-
causal. However, Anselmian variant of agent-causation is different from 
contemporary agent-causation. In contemporary versions, an agent causes 
choice—choice is caused, but agent, as a cause of a choice, is not caused. An 
agent is “uncaused cause”, as a substance, in most contemporary versions 
of agent-causation. St. Anselm and Anselmians as Rogers is, do not require 
this or any other special sort of causation. Though it is up to the agent what 
he will choose, he does this choosing by “per-willing” one of the options that 
is created by God. “Per-willing” means that an agent is aware of both or sev-
eral opposing motives, options, and possibilities which are open for him and 
what to do at t, but he wills one “through to the point of intention”. Rogers 
adds that per-willing for one option entails overriding all the other options. 
In this way, an agent causes indetermined choice but no special powers or 
causation are required.
Chapter four explicates three consequences of such kind of libertarian-
ism. The ontological status of choice is that it has a structure of an event; 
it is not neither state, nor a “thing”. The grounding principle requires that 
true proposition about the choice which is made by an agent is grounded in 
the very choice itself, in its making by an agent. By making a se choices an 
agent makes his or her own character; a se choices enable us that we can 
make our personal characters by ourselves.
Chapter six considers Frankfurt-style counterexamples to the Principle 
of alternate possibility in assessing responsibility and how Anselmianism 
can fare here, and so it provides some interesting solutions; however, since 
literature on this topic is enormously vast, I shall skip it and I shall focus 
on chapters seven and eight which deal with the problem of luck for liber-
tarianism. The problem can have several instances, but mainly consists in 
the following: since it is the case that noone has control over random events, 
then an agent does not have any control over that what happened random-
ly, so random events cannot be freely done events. If something just pops 
up in the consciousness of an agent randomly, then, even if it has a form of 
an intention or looks like a decision, it is an event over which an agent does 
not have any control and so is not done freely. It is just sheer luck that it 
happened (to the agent). In the language of possible worlds, it seems that 
libertarianism is committed to the following: If in world w1 an agent—say 
Catherine, deliberates between A and B, and, freely in libertarian sense, de-
cides in favour of action A at time t, so it was not determined which decision 
Catherine will make until time t, then there is a possible world w2 in which, 
under the same circumstances until time t, Anne freely decides in favour of 
B (instead of A) at time t. What explains the difference between two possible 
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worlds—why Catherine decides for A in w1, and why Catherine decides in 
favour of B in w2 in otherwise completely the same worlds unil time t? It 
seems that there is nothing which can explain this difference—it can be said 
that these decisions are due to sheer luck. It is just luck in one world that 
there is a decision in favour of A and just the same holds for B. But if it is 
so, then decisions for A and B are not freely made because what happens 
by luck, no one has in control and if someone is not in control of something, 
then someone does not have freedom over that. Some of the libertarians try 
to resolve the problem by invoking the probabilistic causation. For them, 
we can assign probabilities (ranging from at least a little bit more from 0 
to at least a little bit less from 1) to making decision for A or B or for any 
number of possible decisions that can be made in some condition. Rogers 
tries, pretty much successfully, to show that assigning probabilities, in both 
interpretations (propensities or relative frequencies) is in fact inapplicable 
to explain libertarian decisions and choices. Regarding possible worlds, she 
shows that possible world apparatus do not add anything new to the luck 
objection classically posed already by, say, St. Augustine or Hobart.
To recapitulate, Anselmian a se choice is made by the agent by per-will-
ing one of the options available to him or her simultaneously and an agent 
is thus responsible for that choice and for acts that follow the choice. Choice 
is truly done by an agent and not by anyone or anything else, not even by 
his or her previous desires; there are no any necessitating factors or causes. 
It is up to the agent to choose A instead of B, simply by per-willing A; in 
other words, this per-willing agent causes choice of A, but itself it is not 
caused by anything. So, the agent that makes a choice in that way is fully 
responsible for the choice. There is no any kind of luck in making a se choice 
by “per-willing”.
This kind of making choices is self-creation of an agent, which means 
that they build their characters on their own. So, Rogers considers that 
those who advocate the luck objection against libertarianism do not prop-
erly grasp choices, character and responsibility and their connections ex-
plained by libertarianism, in this case Anslemian libertarianism. Luck ob-
jection has no force, at least against Anselmian libertarianism.
My recommendation is that you have to read this book by your free will, 
(make a se choice to read it) and, if you are not already a libertarian, to be-
come one, because libertarianism is the one and only, and by necessity, the 
right solution to the problem of free will.
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